Many of us, and I am no exception, have been led to assume, almost un-consciously, that Śankara is India's greatest philosopher and that the non-dualist philosophy he consolidated, Advaita Vedānta, is the supreme spiritual philosophy of India, if not of the whole world. Dualist opponents like Madhva, on the other hand, have usually been appreciated very little, if at all. Several of my colleagues think of Madhva as a reactionary, if brilliant, theist whose philosophy best serves as a foil to (...) Śankara's. Madhva, it almost seems, is studied not for his own philosophical virtues but as a means the better to appreciate Śankara's. I believe that we must weigh more carefully the dualist position, particularly its trenchant critique of non-dualism. We may discover in the process that Śankara, whatever else he was – brilliant stylist, mystic par excellence , deft polemicist – was not the originator or consolidator of anything like an internally consistent metaphysics. (shrink)

The Advaita literature prior to the time of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is scarce. Relying on the citations of proponents and their opponents, the picture we glean of this early monism differs in many aspects from that of Śaṅkara. While Bhavya’s criticism of this monistic thought has received scholarly attention, the chapter Puruṣavāda in Dvādaśāranayacakra has rarely been studied. Broadly, this conversation will help ground classical Advaita in light of the contemporary discourse on naturalism. In particular, this examination will help contextualize (...) the early Advaita that lacks clear imprint of Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrine of Puruṣa, central to this paper, sidelines the role of avidyā or ignorance, and provides a realistic picture of the world. I have relied on the commentary Vṛtti upon the Vākyapadīya as has been substantially cited in DNC in order to advance the arguments. As a consequence, the examination on Puruṣa also paves the path for advancing arguments on linguistic monism. (shrink)

The similarities in the philosophies of Parmenides and Śaṅkara1 need to be better understood than they have been so far. I will argue that the goal they share can be characterized as that of leading their audiences to nondual reality, which is the only trustworthy knowledge or experience one can have. They refer to this nondual reality respectively as being and Brahman. Even if the phrase ‘nondual reality’ or ‘nondual experience’ strikes many readers as controversial if applied to Parmenides’ being, (...) it agrees with the ‘fashionable’ Parmenides interpretations that insist that Parmenides’ laws of thought, such as the impossibility of knowing not-being,2 will enable us to understand what being is; and it makes.. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reliability of the criteria for determining Śaṅkara’s authorship established by Paul Hacker. His analysis of terminological peculiarities is based on only one of Śaṅkara’s works—the commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras. Therefore, doubt arises as to whether these criteria also apply to other works that we can claim to be authentic. First, it will be argued that the commentaries on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and Taittirīya-Upaniṣad are works that can be—with reasonable certainty—considered authentic. When applied to these two works, Hacker’s (...) criteria work remarkably well, and the commentaries on the Taittirīya- and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad share the same terminological and conceptual features with the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. Moreover, in most cases, it is possible to distinguish the usage of some terms and concepts from Sureśvara and Padmapāda. On the other hand, Sureśvara and Padmapāda use some of these terms in a quite similar way as Śaṅkara, but differently than the later Advaitins, indicating that a sharp line between Śaṅkara on the one hand and Sureśvara and Padmapāda on the other cannot be drawn in many cases. Also, the writings of these authors—especially Padmapāda—represent a transitional phase in the development of certain Advaita Vedānta concepts although the outlines of some peculiarities by which the later Advaita Vedānta differs from Śaṅkara can already be found sketched by Śaṅkara himself. (shrink)

This paper examines the work of the unsung modern Indian Philosopher A. C. Mukerji, in his major works Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). Mukerji constructs a skeptical challenge that emerges from the union of ideas drawn from early modern Europe, neo-Hegelian philosophy, and classical Buddhism and Vedānta. Mukerji’s worries about skepticism are important in part because they illustrate many of the creative tensions within the modern, synthetic period of Indian philosophy, and in part because (...) they are truly profound, anticipating in interesting ways the worries that Feyerabend was to raise a few decades later. Arguing that Humean, Kantian, neo-Hegelian, and Buddhist philosophy each fail to provide an adequate account of self-knowledge, Mukerji leverages this finding to further argue that these systems fail to offer a proper account of knowledge more generally. His solution to skepticism centers on a distinctively modern interpretation of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. (shrink)

The history of the Vedanta school is well known since the time of Sankaracarya on, and its prehistory before Sankara is quite obscure. However, from the time of compilation of major Upanisads to Sankara there is a period of thousand years, and the tradition of Upanisads was not lost; there appeared many philosophers and dogmaticians, although their thoughts are not clearly known. The author has made clear the details of the pre-Sankara Vedanta philosophy, utilizing not only Sanskrit materials, but also (...) Pali, Prakrit (Jain), as well as Tibetan and Chinese sources. In this respect this is quite a unique work. For this work the author was awarded the Imperial Prize by the Academy of Japan. Some sections of this work were already published in Indian as well as European and American journals in English. This work is a complete English translation of the entire book. The English translation was done with the financial aid by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and the final touch was given by Mr. Trevor Leggett, the British writer, who is well-versed in Sanskrit as well as in Japanese. (shrink)

The Bhagavad Gītā has inspired more interpretive controversy than any other religious scripture in India’s history. The Gītā, a philosophical and spiritual poem of approximately seven hundred verses, is part of the ancient Sanskrit epic, the Mahābhārata. In the Gītā, the Lord Kṛṣṇa, who appears in the form of a charioteer, imparts spiritual teachings to the warrior Arjuna and convinces him to fight in a just war that entails the slaughter of many of Arjuna’s own relatives and loved ones. Śaṅkara, (...) the great eighth-century champion of the Advaita school of philosophy, wrote the first extant commentary on the Gītā. In this commentary, Śaṅkara interpreted the Gītā strictly in accordance with Advaita.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism by Swami MedhanandaAnantanand Rambachan (bio)Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism. By Swami Medhananda. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xv + 412. Hardcover $99.00, isbn 978-0-197624-46-3.As a young man, Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, addressed a direct question to the teachers he encountered in his quest for religious certainty. "Have you seen God?" asked Vivekananda. The first affirmative reply to his question (...) came in 1882 when he met Ramakrishna (1836-1886), who eventually became his teacher and mentor:"Do you believe in God, Sir?" asked Vivekananda."Yes," replied Ramakrishna."Can you prove it Sir?""Yes.""How?""Because I see him just as I see you here, only in a much intenser sense."(p. 144)Ramakrishna's unhesitating reply had a deep impact on the young Vivekananda. "For the first time," said Vivekananda, "I found a man who dared to say that he saw God, that religion was a reality to be felt, to be sensed in an infinitely more intense way than we can sense the world" (p. 144).This pivotal encounter with Ramakrishna and his claim about the perception of God found more systematic expression in Vivekananda's arguments for supersensuous perception as the only ultimately authoritative source of knowledge about the nature of God and other matters that are not accessible through our ordinary ways of knowing. Medhananda's book, Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism, is a wide-ranging discussion of many facets of Vivekananda's interpretations of the tradition of Advaita Vedānta and religion in general. These include the decisive influence of Ramakrishna on Vivekananda, Vivekananda's departure from Śaṅkara, and his understanding of the possibilities and limits of reason, the nature of faith and the hard problem of consciousness. The single theme, implicitly and explicitly, present throughout his discussion, is the reality and epistemic significance of mystical experience: "For Vivekananda, we can achieve 'objective certitude' of God's existence…through a self-authenticating realization of God that guarantees its own veridicality" (p. 285). [End Page 1] Medhananda ends his work calling for greater recognition of the importance of spiritual experience for our understanding of the nature of consciousness (p. 371). One comes away from his work thinking that the edifice of Vivekananda's philosophy stands or fall on his arguments for supersensuous perception as the highest authority for religious claims. Medhanananda is critical of appeals by Vivekananda to scripture unless such appeals are buttressed by affirming the supremacy of supersensuous experience (p. 341). Medhananda regards references to scripture alone as dogmatic. In those Advaita traditions, however, that regard scripture as a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), arguments for scripture are not asserted without appeals to reason and the evidence of other sources of valid knowledge (Rambachan 1991). In other words, appeals to scripture are not always dogmatically irrational.At the end of The Limits of Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of the Vedas, I invited those who are the direct heirs of Vivekananda's legacy and those movements who have come under his influence "to provide a consistent and coherent account of the synthesis that he attempted" (p. 137). I regard Medhananda's work as a significant contribution to this much-needed task. His work on Vivekananda is an exercise in apologetics, understood as the effort to defend and clarify religious teachings through systematic argument, and is one of the most detailed, scholarly, and vigorous contemporary expositions of Vivekananda's thought. As a work in apologetics, however, readers will not find any significant criticism of Vivekananda's thought. The single significant one I found is his observation that there is a patronizing element in Vivekananda's situating of dualistic traditions on a lower salvific level than non-dualism (pp. 88-90).I am heartened by the fact that Medhananda acknowledges important differences between Vivekananda and Śaṅkara on several significant issues. As a scholar-monk of the Ramakrishna Order, Medhananda's position is unusual on this issue, and he must diverge from prominent members of his Order in this regard. At the heart of this difference is Śaṅkara's insistence on the... (shrink)

Though I loved Sanskrit, I had a skeptical and heretical attitude towards many beliefs cherished in Sanskrit knowledge systems. I found philosophy to be the right platform to pursue noble ideals without compromising my skeptical and heretical approach. While criticizing Śaṅkara’s Advaita-Vedānta perspective, I tried to present a reconstruction of the Lokāyata perspective, which is traditionally identified with Indian materialism, by making it more intelligible and relevant. The orthodox-heterodox division of Indian Philosophy was also important for me for its moral-social (...) implications. Hence, I was interested in Jainism and Buddhism. My research interests in these schools covered their ethics, epistemology, and logic. My studies in Buddhism led me to take seriously the impact of Buddhism on Indian culture, and also the rational and secular reconstruction of Buddhism rendered by the thinkers like Satyanarayan Goenka, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, and B. R. Ambedkar. One of the driving forces in my intellectual journey has been my view that if the Indian social order is to be rid of the caste system and made more rational and moral as well as less superstitious and unjust, the centrality of Brahmanical schools has to be replaced by that of non-Brahmanical schools. (shrink)

This essay will pose and seek to answer the following question: If, as Swami Vivekananda claims, the four yogas are independent and equally effective paths to God-realization and liberation from the cycle of rebirth, then what must reality be like? What ontology is implied by the claim that the four yogas are all equally effective paths to the supreme goal of religious life? What metaphysical conditions would enable this pluralistic assertion to be true? Swami Vivekananda’s worldview is frequently identified with (...) Advaita Vedānta. We shall see that Vivekananda’s teaching is certainly Advaitic in what could be called a broad sense. As Anantanand Rambachan and others, however, have pointed out, it would be incorrect to identify Swami Vivekananda’s teachings in any rigid or dogmatic sense with the classical Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara; this is because Vivekananda’s teaching departs from that of Śaṅkara in some significant ways, not least in his assertion of the independent salvific efficacy of the four yogas. This essay will argue that Swami Vivekananda’s pluralism, based on the concept of the four yogas, is far more akin to the deep religious pluralism that is advocated by contemporary philosophers of religion in the Whiteheadian tradition of process thought like David Ray Griffin and John Cobb, the classical Jain doctrines of relativity (anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda), and, most especially, the Vijñāna Vedānta of Vivekananda’s guru, Sri Ramakrishna, than any of these approaches is to the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Advaita Vedānta, in Vivekananda’s pluralistic worldview, becomes one valid conceptual matrix among many that bear the ability to support an efficacious path to liberation. This essay is intended not as an historical reconstruction of Vivekananda’s thought, so much as a constructive philosophical contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversations about both religious (and, more broadly, worldview) pluralism and the religious and philosophical legacies of both Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. The former conversation has arrived at something of an impasse (as recounted by Kenneth Rose), while the latter conversation has recently been revived, thanks to the work of Swami Medhananda (formerly Ayon Maharaj) and Arpita Mitra. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen PhillipsSwami Narasimhananda (bio)God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion. Translated, with Introduction and Explanatory Notes, by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2021. Pp. xx + 91. Paperback $19.00, isbn 978-1-62466-957-6.The scarcity of accessible English translations of Sanskrit texts (...) that retain the philosophical rigor of the original has been a great challenge in Indian philosophy. God and the World's Arrangement, a translation with introduction and explanatory notes by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips, is an example of how this scarcity could be addressed without straying away from present-day idioms and context. This book discusses the perspectives on God and the arrangement of the world according to Nyāya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhist philosophies. This book is divided into two parts, followed by two appendices, and a bibliography. Each part has study questions at the end and there is an impressive reading list. The first part is a translation and analysis of Śaṅkara's theistic argument in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra 2.2.1–10. The translators also include the subcommentary by Vācaspati Miśra. The second part contains the translation and analysis of Vācaspati Miśra's theistic argument in his commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra 4.1.19–21. All translations are followed by explanations that elaborate the contexts of the arguments. The translations in this book are elegant and use modern English idioms.The seeds of this book were sown by a guest lecture by Nirmalya Guha to a philosophy course at the University of Texas at Austin. The other two authors joined hands with Guha and worked on texts from Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhist schools of thought. Scholars around the world are now interested in having a pan-global view of philosophy. However, such an understanding requires an informed engagement with the various contexts and mores of thought. This deceptively slim volume addresses this problem by succinctly providing the required background context and clarifying many commonly held misconceptions about Indian philosophy, particularly Advaita Vedānta. For a long time, there have not been many serious readings of Advaita Vedānta texts. This book comes as a relief and explains the basic concepts of Advaita Vedānta with readings from relevant portions of texts like the Brahma-sūtra. This book is a step to fill the gap [End Page 1] of texts that properly voice the perspectives of scholars from within the traditions following Advaita Vedānta.It is heartening to read a contemporary text that acknowledges the unbiased masterly exegetical work of Vācaspati Miśra that earned him the epithet sarva-tantra-svatantra, "one who is equally proficient in all the disciplines of knowledge." The translators and editors of this book have a noble goal of "coupling Vācaspati's works on Vedānta and on Nyāya" to make "it possible for a wide swath of his work to be pondered, little of which is currently accessible despite Vācaspati's importance for the whole of classical Indian philosophical thought" (p. xi). The editors lose no time in clarifying the approach of the texts explained in the book from Vedānta and Nyāya philosophies. They explain in some detail one of the means of knowledge, pramāṇa s, used by the Indian philosophies that adhere to the Vedās, the means of anumāṇa or inference. An interesting aspect of this book is the contemporary examples that the translators give, like those of a politician and automobile manufacturers. For instance, the translators explain different ways in which arguments given through an example can fail. The translators explain the error of an example not having the property to be proved in this manner:Yet another type of failure occurs when the property to be proved is not actually present in the example. Should one argue that "People who purchase Japanese vehicles... (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of ConsciousnessChakravarthi Ram-PrasadStudies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2004. Pp. 231.Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness, by Sukhar-anjan Saha, is a collection of papers each of which has something to say about consciousness in Advaita, although some of the papers have a rather tenuous connection to (...) this theme. Saha brings to bear a lifetime of study of Advaita and its philosophical contexts in these essays. The one notable lacuna in his approach is the tendency to ignore virtually all contemporary literature on Advaita, and to concentrate almost entirely on the original Sanskrit texts themselves—although he is clearly at home in a variety of modern philosophical techniques. His views are, in themselves, interesting and carefully spelled out.In "The Many Faces of the 'I,' " Saha draws on well-known uses of aham in Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, and Padmapāda to draw the larger conclusion that Advaita is willing to allow for multiple, context-variant senses of 'I,' in contrast to both a Naiyāyika like Gadhādhara and Western thinkers like Husserl."Advaita Analysis of Suffering" is an elegant and surprising essay. Much of it appears to be a fairly general survey of the manner in which different Hindu and Buddhist thinkers identify a positive cognitive error in understanding reality—avidyā—as the cause of suffering. But Saha notes that the classical consensus on suffering is not an empirical statement; there are ordinary success stories, after all. He then ingeniously uses this fact to show that suffering is something structural to existence. Śaṅkara's example of someone who feels "I am fair-complexioned" is a smug indication of the suffering brought to bear on others who are not, in a society that favors fair complexion. Suffering, Saha argues, is socially relative; it relates to value structures more than mere physical discomfort. If all were of the highest or lowest varna, there would be neither pride nor striving, neither bragging nor lamenting. The metaphysical discussion on suffering, it turns out, is really a commentary on Hindu society.Saha heroically—in the light of modern, especially Western scholarship, which sees Śaṅkara as an arch-conservative proponent of brahminical values—tends to see the Advaitin as a social reformer. In the essay above, he sees ś an.kara as teaching precisely the social lesson against discrimination when he talks of suffering. Saha returns to this theme in "Śaṅkara and Varna Distinctions in Hinduism." He puts forward the argument that since Śaṅkara held that all social distinctions were not ultimate (pāramārthika), and since class/varna distinctions are social ones while liberating knowledge is ultimate, varna is irrelevant to liberation. How those traditionally excluded from brahminical philosophy will respond to this generosity is another matter. [End Page 107]In "Inner Sense and Higher Order Consciousness," Saha usefully explains how Nyāya takes an awareness of awareness to be a matter of inner sense, while Advaita denies this. It is sometimes hard to follow him through the essay, as it is not always clear what is being argued. But the contours of the standard Nyāya and Advaita positions on putative higher-order consciousness are laid out competently. The Nyāya position is clear enough, in that the higher-order awareness is an inner perception, with the mind playing the role of an 'inner' organ for the self. So the self becomes conscious of an object through the mind, and that act of consciousness itself becomes an object of the mind; in the latter instance, the mind functions to generate a higher-order consciousness, taking the first mental state as its object. This is relatively clear, but puts a great burden on Nyāya to give a cogent theory of mind, such that the idea of the mind as an inner sense organ becomes persuasive. But this challenge lies beyond the scope of Saha's essay.Gradually, Saha's argument emerges. Advaita takes the mind to be separate from consciousness, which is the untouched ātman. So, there may well be mental... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:New Perspectives on Advaita Vedānta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJGodabarisha MishraNew Perspectives on Advaita Vedā nta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJ. Edited by Bradley J. Malkovsky. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Pp. x + 187.New Perspectives on Advaita Vedānta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJ., intended as a tribute to Professor Richard De Smet (1916-1997) on his eightieth birthday, (...) turned out to be a posthumous memorial volume due to his sad demise. It comprises eight essays apart from an Introduction by the editor, Bradley J. Malkovsky, who provides an overview of De Smet's life and works. Select scholars of international eminence who are acquainted with the intellectual acumen of De Smet have contributed to this volume, thereby honoring and perpetuating the memory of this Jesuit priest-professor, who significantly contributed to the understanding and interpretation of the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. The introductory essay offers a detailed picture of the scholarly pursuits of De Smet, whose philosophical journey spanned six decades. He spent much of his life seriously exploring avenues for translating intercultural philosophical dialogue into reality. This essay throws much light on the lesser-known areas of De Smet's life—religious, political, and philosophical as well as academic.Though born in Belgium, De Smet preferred to live in India, and he was one of the very few Christian priests who strove to discover the unity in Hindu and Christian [End Page 610] spirituality, through and beyond the theology of both religions. In his early years he studied Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and Bonaventure, and this helped him to understand the philosophy of Śaṅkara at a deeper level. He felt that Śaṅkara's Advaita is a theology based on revelation rather than pure philosophy upheld through personal experience or independent reason. In pursuing his interest in interreligious dialogue, De Smet worked actively toward dispelling the notion that the Church is blindly dogmatic and has no intellectual face worth the name. He traveled much and had intellectual interaction with many celebrated Hindu monks and academicians on theological and philosophical issues. He introduced Upaniṣadic studies in many Christian Ashrams and spoke to Catholic parishes on the rich heritage of Indian spirituality. To establish a genuine space for his approach to doing Indian philosophy he founded the Association of Christian Philosophers of India in 1975 and for a long time served as its chairman. He authored six books and a number of essays, and his ongoing project dealing with the encounter of Vedānta and Christian theology since Roberto de Nobili remains unfulfilled due to his demise.De Smet considered the system of Śa71E45;kara to be the most profound metaphysical system in Indian philosophy. He was convinced of the similarity between Aquinas and Śaṅkara to the extent of believing that Christian personalism presupposed a nondualist metaphysics. For him, Pure Brahman is more than a vast ocean of pure consciousness; it is also capable of love, causation, and grace—but in such a way that its simplicity, plenitude, and transcendence are not compromised. He felt that even Para Brahman, which may transcend the ordinary human mode of personhood, is not totally impersonal. The supreme reality freely chooses to be a world creator, and so forth, without undergoing any change. Śaṅkara does not deny the existence of the world when he uses negations in describing the world. De Smet feels that Śaṅkara was a radical valuationist who measured everything in relation to the absolute value, the Brahman (p. 16).If personalism, the concept of love, and also to some extent the theory of creation as presented by De Smet are to be very strictly viewed, then there is no alternative but to conclude that he was only engaged in doing some type of theistic Vedānta, like Viśiṣṭādvaita, but not Advaita. De Smet seemed to be stretching Advaita a little too far in trying to see its total affinity with theology and striving to accommodate personalism and so forth through his reading of and commitment to Christianity. Para Brahman in an. Śaṅkara's Advaita is not... (shrink)

John Taber brings to this study many insights in a well-written and energetic work. He has chosen a challenging task: making understandable three formidable mystics Sankara Fichte, and Heidegger. They all took pride in shifting attention from reason and sense experience to faith and tradition. Of Fichte’s account of Kant’s philosophy, Kant said: “God, save us only from our friends: we can cope with our enemies!”. Sankara and Heidegger also never cease to astonish philosophers who take rationality seriously.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part TwoAndrew O. FortA History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part Two. By Hajime Nakamura. Translated by Hajime Nakamura, Trevor Leggett, et al.. Edited by Sengaku Mayeda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004. Pp. xxi + 842. Hardcover $58.95.First, to address the exact nature of this volume: the bulk of A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part Twoby Hajime Nakamura was part of Nakamura's doctoral (...) thesis submitted to Tokyo University in 1942, with, as the front flap states, "many additions and revisions done by the author himself." Part 1 was published by Motilal Banarsidass in 1976. For those interested, that first volume includes four parts: the chronology and significance of early Vedānta philosophy, early Vedānta philosophy as seen by other Indian (particularly Buddhist) thinkers and schools, scholars before the Brahmasūtra, and the nature and content of the Brahmasūtraitself. Part 2 is thus rather overdue, although various portions of this volume were published in the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, we should be grateful that the English-speaking world finally has more of the vast erudition of this titan of scholarship on Hindu thought, yet acknowledge that this is as much a pioneering historical document in Advaita research as a contribution to current knowledge.Despite this reservation, let us begin with fulsome praise: how many scholars in any discipline from any period can rival Hajime Nakamura? Even in his dissertation, he shows wide familiarity with Hindu and Buddhist thought, having consulted sources in Sanskrit, Pāli, Prakrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, English, German, and probably others. Who, ever again, would have the courage, or the linguistic skills, to attempt a book called Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples?Truly this was a jñānasāgara!Still, one must say that the present volume has shortcomings beyond age: it is not particularly well-organized or "user-friendly," not always well-focused, and sometimes repetitious. The translations, while clear, are generally not graceful. And in the decades since the bulk of this was written, much additional scholarship on key figures and texts discussed therein has been published, and new theoretical conceptualizations have arisen to aid our understandings. Depending on one's view, this text reveals the notable absence of (or freedom from) contemporary scholarly currents of postcolonial, postmodern, or feminist critique, nor does it reflect the move to greater social history often apparent today. It is also surprisingly noncomparative, given the author's later work. This, then, is mostly a traditional history of the development of ideas by one of the pitāmahasof classical Indian scholarship.The book is divided into four basic sections. First are remarks on the life, works, and ideas of post- Brahmasūtrabut pre-Śaṅkara thinkers such as Upavarṣa, Bodhāyana (who influenced Rāmānuja), and Bhartṛprapañca (whom Śaṅkara and Sureśvara opposed, particularly on jñānakarma-samuccaya), with frequent comparisons of their thinking with that of Śaṅkara. This section well traces the basic time and lineage of key thinkers, and nicely unpacks their views and later influence. [End Page 480]Next is an extended consideration of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍükyakārikās, which is probably the most important pre-Śaṅkara Advaita work. Nakamura describes and offers extensive analysis of each chapter (prakaraṇa)and its characteristics separately, particularly the thought (on consciousness states, māyā, ajātivāda, and Buddhist ideas, respectively) and practices ( ommeditation, Self-realization, asparśayoga, etc.) distinctive to each. He clearly shows the differences in doctrine and application among the chapters, and between them and the Māndūkya Upaniṣad. Nakamura raises the questions of the text's authorship, sacrality, unity, and extent of Buddhist influence, which had already been debated by many scholars at that time, and yet this section shows its age; while even-handedly summarizing the discussion to that point, and offering his own judiciously reasoned conclusions (most importantly, that they are four independently composed treatises), his conclusions are neither groundbreaking nor today near to the last word. In fact, I was reminded of reading through those debates as I was... (shrink)

As is the case with most pre‐modern philosophers of India, very little historical information is available about Bhartṛ‐hari. There are many interesting legends, some turned into extensive plays and poems, current about him. However, it is impossible to determine on their basis even whether there was only one philosopher called Bhartṛ‐hari. The appellation “philosopher” could unquestionably be applied to the author or authors of at least two Sanskrit works that are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛ‐hari.

Aphoristic work on the meditational fundamentals of the Yoga school of Indic philosophy.

Commentary on Mīmāṃsābhāṣya of Śabarasvāmi, which in turn is a commentary of Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini, basic work on the Mīmāṃsā school in Hindu philosophy; contains texts of Mīmāṃsābhāṣya and Mīmāṃsāsūtra.

Hindu cosmology in Sankhya philosophy and Kashmir Saivism; a study.

Study on Buddhism and philosophy, and secularism; seminar papers. study.

Research articles on various aspects of Indic philosophy, Tantrism and Hindu culture.

Work on doctrines of Hinduism and philosophy; Sanskrit text with Hindi commentary.

Critical study of ethics in Vaishnava-puranas; Hindu mythological text.

Concept of manas in Indic philosophy; a study.

Comparative study of Advaita Vedanta and Kashmir Śaivism.

Study of fundamental philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism and Vednata philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya.

Study on Yoga as depicted in Mahābhārata, Hindu classical epic.

On Hindu philosophy and Sanskrit semantics; transcript of lectures delivered at the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1980.

Classical commentary on Yogasūtra of Patañjali.

SAT's most recent publication, this English translation from the original Sankrit by Adi Sankara is a very clear, aphoristic explanation of what the self is and the Knowledge that reveals.

Verse work, with autocommentary, on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

Research work on Buddhist philosophy and doctrines.

Comparative study of Suttanipāta and Upanishads.

On various aspects of Hinduism, Hindu philosophy, and Sanskrit literature.

Study of Vedanta philosophy before and after Śaṅkarācārya.

Selection of texts from the Upanishads and other classical works.